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A MODEL OF ADAPTIVE, MARKET BEHAVIOR GENERATING POSITIVE
RETURNS, VOLATILITY AND SYSTEM RISK.
MISHA PEREPELITSA
ABSTRACT. We describe a simple model for speculative trading based on adaptive behavior of
economic agents. The adaptive behavior is expressed through a feedback mechanism for changing
agents’ stock-to-bond ratios, depending on the past performance of their portfolios. The stock price
is set according to the demand-supply for the asset derived from the agents’ target risk levels.
Using the methodology of agent-based modeling we show that agents, acting endogenously and
adaptively, create a persistent price bubble. The price dynamics generated by the trading process
does not reveal any singularities, however the process is accompanied by growing aggregated risk
that indicates increasing likelihood of a crash.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider an agent-based model of economic behavior built on behavioral traits typical in
the models of exchange: a) every agent acts in his/her own interest; b) agents have heterogeneous
preferences; c) agents interact and the interactions result in mutually optimal outcome; d) agents’
behavior is adaptive; e) agents share a common belief that it is advantageous to participate in the
market activity. Traits a.–d. describe individual behavior, while the last condition, f., is a group
property.
The above conditions do not define a model in a unique way, as many different problems can
fit into that framework, depending on the meaning of the terms “preferences”, “interactions”, “op-
timal”, “own interest”, “adaptive behavior”, and “ an outcome being advantageous”. For these
terms we going to have precise definitions, originating in the analysis of speculative markets, that
we describe in the paragraphs below. In short, the interactions will mean setting new price of an
equity, agents’ preferences will be defined by the stock-to-bond ratio, and adaptive behavior will
be expressed through the changes in stock-to-bond ratios.
We will show that when the fundamental value of the traded asset is not readily estimated,
being, for example, of speculative nature, the group of agents acting endogenously, according to
conditions a.–f. can generate price dynamics with positive return. As there are no exogenous
inputs in the model, the outcome is clearly a price bubble resulting from adaptive, self-centered
behavior of agents. The phenomenon has some interesting features that make it different from the
speculative bubbles due to actions of “chartists” traders, expected utility maximizers, or due to the
herding behavior of traders.
For one thing, the price bubble is persistent, as all agents in the group find it beneficial to carry
on, provided they ignore mounting “systematic risk” of a breakdown (crash) of the market activity.
We note here, that the systematic risk is a group property and it is typically not observed by the
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agents, and thus not factored into the agents’ short-term decision making process. On a long run
the agents will eventually take the risk into consideration, and the price bubble will terminate. In
section 3 we briefly discuss different scenarios of how that process may proceed.
Additionally, the model produces price fluctuations with some statistical similarity to fluctu-
ations of real markets. A price chart generated by the adaptive model is a graph growing, or
decreasing, at a constant rate with some persistent but not increasing volatility. Charts like that are
not uncommon for the market indexes over a span of few years. We conjecture that the adaptive
type of behavior described in this paper contributes substantially to long term growth dynamics in
speculative markets.
Models of adaptive economic behavior were developed by many authors in many different con-
texts. In a strategic decision making they were advanced as models of convergence by Cross [3],
models of learning in games by Fundenberg-Levine[4], reinforcement learning models by Roth-
Erev [17], to mention just a few contributions.
The structure of agents’ interactions in the model that we consider in this paper differs from the
models in the above-mentioned references. Here, agents use a singe strategy, or to be more precise
all agents use the same rule for the change of their strategies, and non-equilibrium price dynamics
is generated by heterogeneity of agents’ strategies caused by the updating rule. In our study we
adopt the methodology of multi-agent dynamic simulations in the spirit of works of Stigler [18],
Kim-Markowitz [14], Arthur-Holland-LeBaron-Palmer-Tayler [1], Levy-Levy-Solomon [8].
1.1. Motivation. The importance of the behavioral aspects of speculative markets has always
been acknowledged. It is hardy deniable that irrationality of market participants and “animal spir-
its” are ubiquitous features that drive price instabilities and critical events. Attempts to understand
the price changes in stock markets lead to the introduction of agent-based models that mimic the
behavioral patterns of different groups of traders. Terms like “fundamentalists”, “noise-traders”,
“portfolio re-balancers”, “portfolio insurers”, “adaptive learners” have been introduced into the
models. Kim-Markowitz [14] have shown the destabilizing effect of constant portfolio insurers on
the price dynamics and proposed it as an explanation for the market crush of 1987. The analysis of
multi-agent models in Levy-Levy-Solomon [5, 6] shows that the rational traders (fundamentalists)
do not out-evolve the irrational traders (chartists), and the later group will cause the price dynam-
ics to go through a series of booms and crushes, that has statistical similarities with the empirical
data. A number of non-linear differential equation models were proposed in Lux [9, 10, 11] and
Lux-Marchesi [12, 13] to describe the evolution of the population of different types of traders,
their interactions, the price dynamics and changes in agents’ wealth. The model generates com-
plex chaotic dynamics with the clustering of volatility of returns, fat tails in the distribution of
returns and wealth, as well as the long-term memory. Even if one restricts the traders to be ra-
tional, expected utility maximizers, the price will persistently develop so called rational bubbles
introduced in Mandelbrot [15] and Blanchard-Watson[2]. Thus, the significant deviation from the
fundamental value is the generic property of speculative prices.
This paper focuses on the behavior of the market as a whole, consisting of many kinds stocks.
The statistical properties of market portfolios are different from that of a single stock. Looking
at index charts, from after the Great Depression and onward, it is not unusual to see long periods
of the scale 5-10 years when the market indexes grow at nearly constant rates, with mild, non-
increasing volatility, and returns that fluctuate randomly around the mean.
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The positive returns, admittedly, are influenced by macro-economic parameters, such as the
return on US government bonds. But the quantitative expression for the dependency or for the de-
viations is not clear. We suggest that some of the features of ”the happy growth” market dynamics
can be generated endogenously by market participants following adaptive strategies. Moreover,
we suggest that such behavior contributes to dramatics events that inevitably end the period of op-
timistic growth. To provide explanations we analyze an agent-based model in which interactions
between agents mimic actual trading processes. The model is built on the following assumptions.
In the changing market environment traders constantly have to revise their investment portfolios,
moving funds between ”safer” and ”riskier” assets, and to change their risk levels. We will assume
that this re-balancing and updating of portfolios completely determines the dynamics of the market
as a whole. To be more specific we postulate that a) the price of the market portfolio is set by
agents willing to re-balance funds between their stock and a safe, cash or bond, asset; b) when
re-balancing, agents act solely on the basis of their stock-to-bond ratios; c) agents change their
investment ratios adaptively to the changes in their portfolios.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the market dynamics described by the rules a.-c.,
isolating this type of behavior from other market factors. The main finding is a formula (4) on page
5 for the mean return in the excess of the safe investment return r as a function of the systematic
risk, that is, the risk of a crash, imposed by the collective behavior of the group.
2. THE MODEL
To introduce the model we start with a market of only two agents trading shares of a single asset.
The agents, call them Petra and Paula, do not know the asset fundamental value, but expect that the
price can grow at moderate rates for long periods of time, and they always prefer increasing value
to decreasing.
The agents meet at time intervals that we label with n = 0,1,2.. At period n, Petra’s portfolio
has (sn1,b
n
1), dollar value of stock and bond investments, and Paula’s: (s
n
2,b
n
2). The stock price per
share at period n is Pn. The next period investment portfolio (sn+1i ,b
n+1
i ) and price P
n+1 determined
trough the following steps.
Evaluating the last change in their portfolios, agents set target stock-to-bond ratios for the next
period, that we denote by kn+1i . The new price P
n+1 is set in such a way that the dollar amount
of funds that Petra wishes to move from stocks to bonds, to be at the target ratio kn+11 , equals
the dollar amount Paula wants to move from bonds to stock to be at her ratio kn+12 . This balance
expressed as
(1)
Pn+1
Pn
sn1− k
n+1
1 b
n
1 = k
n+1
2 b
n
2−
Pn+1
Pn
sn2.
Here we assuming that any fractional amount of a share can be exchanged, and for simplicity
of the exposition, consider the case with zero interest in the bond account. With the newly set
price the agents re-balance portfolios and evaluate the market performance by comparing ratios
Pn+1sni /(P
nbni ) to target values k
n+1
i . If P
n+1sni /(P
nbni )> k
n+1
i , from the agent i point of view, the
market performed better than expected, and if Pn+1sni /(P
nbni ) < k
n+1
i it performed worse. Since
when one agent is selling shares the other one is buying, Petra and Paula have different opinions
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on the market performance. The agents update the target portfolio ratios according to the rule
(2) kn+2i =


αkn+1i
Pn+1sni
Pnbni
> kn+1i ,
kn+1i
Pn+1sni
Pnbni
= kn+1i ,
βkn+1i
Pn+1sni
Pnbni
< kn+1i .
With α > 1, 0 < β < 1, we refer to this rule as an adaptive feedback mechanism. If the agent
identifies a growing market she increases her stock-to-bond ratio by a fixed amount, while the
other agent decreases her ratio. The feedback reflects the fact that when faced with a series of
bad investments the agent will reduce the equity part of the portfolio, while with the investment
growing better than expected, the agent will take riskier position.
It easy to see that there is an equilibrium when no shares are traded and price doesn’t change:
sni = s
0
i , b
n
i = b
0
i , k
n
i = s
0
i /b
0
i , P
n = P0. Small deviations will set off a non-trivial dynamics. In this
process, Petra and Paula will alternatively change their preferences by factors α and β , so that, on
average, the stock-to-bond ratios change at the rate (αβ )1/2 per period. The gross return, Pn+1/Pn,
after a short transient period will settle at the average value of (αβ )1/2 per period, but will keep
oscillating around that value, see the top graph in Figure 1. The stock price goes up when agents
have bias toward the increase of the risk preferences, expressing the optimistic outlook, quantified
by the condition αβ > 1.
The story of this process is simple: Petra and Paula are trading stock and and move their stock-
to-bond ratios up and down with an upward average trend. This drives up the average demand and
consequently the price.
Figure 2 shows a simulated, traded dollar value of stock per period. The volume keeps growing
up to a certain limit – the amount of cash available to agents. At the same time, as the stock price
increases exponentially, the number of traded shares will approach zero.
To make a model more viable we can arrange the trading mechanism so that agents do not need
to interact directly or even know about each other. They might be matched by a third party, a
market maker, to whom they submit their order books. Moreover, the stock price might change
in between the periods when Petra and Paula are trading, due to, for example, actions of other
agents. The middle graph in Figure 1 shows a realization of the stock price when it is changing as
a geometric random walk between Petra and Paula trading sessions. The outcome is still the same:
Petra and Paula are pushing price up, The rate of increase, per unit of time, depends now on how
many times during that periods they trade.
To make the model completely endogenous we populated the market by many copies of Petra
and Paula. At every trading period there will be a group of ”active” traders willing to re-balance
their portfolios. They submit the book orders to the market maker who executes the orders and
sets the new price, according to the rule similar to (1), see section 4 for details. Each active agent
uses rule (2) to update her stock-to-bond ratio taking into account only the performance of her
portfolio. The process proceeds to the next step, with a new, randomly chosen group of active
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traders. The model is determined by the following parameters: N–number of agents, m–number of
active agents that is fixed or can be chosen from a distribution, τ–the number of trading periods per
year, the feedback mechanism (2) and the set of initial portfolios together with the starting price
P0 per share. With such parameters, each agent, on average, re-balances his portfolio mτ/M times
per year, which we set to be of order 1.
A typical realization of price dynamics is shown in Figure 3. Statistically, the returns quickly
move to a stationary regime with no significant long term correlations. The bottom graph in figures
1 shows the realizations of the gross return. The product αβ still determines if the stock price is
pumped up or down. The formula for the mean return per year
(3) E[R]/r = (αβ )
mτ
2N ,
where r is the return on cash account, appears to be a good quantitative approximation for the
geometric mean of return on the stock investment, see Perepelitsa-Timofeev [16] for a technical
report on numerical simulations of the model.
3. DISCUSSION
Besides the price charts, agent-based models provide detailed information on the wealth distri-
bution among agents. This information allows one to study the effects of market activity on the
population of agents. As an example, let us consider trading between N = 500 agents with the
parameters used in simulation presented in Figure 3. The stock price is going up at the rate 14%
per year with the standard deviation of 0.08. In 10 years, agents that started with the identical
portfolios and stock-to-bond ratios, have their portfolios distributed according to Figure 4.
Note that in total money (stock+bond) all agents are better off participating in the market than
holding everything in cash. Moreover, almost a half of them have increased their bond accounts as
well as stock investments. This however comes at the price of all agents adopting more riskier posi-
tions, as measured by their stock-to-bond ratios. After 10 years, the mean ratio in the population is
5, compared to its initial value of 1/3. The minimum of the ratio over the group is 2. The group be-
comes significantly riskier. We can relate this risk to the systematic risk of the market breakdown.
Indeed, every trading period, a real-life agent would face a decision to continue trading using the
strategy (2) or start selling the stock, in hope to recover its cash value. The outcome would depend
on what other agents are doing. It can be expressed by a version of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, Table 1,
in which the agent plays against the rest of the group and chooses between “staying”, continuing
using adaptive strategy, or “selling,” selling of all stock shares. As the payoffs in the game grow
the agent will eventually prefer to use his dominant strategy “sell.” With the rest of the agents
following the same path, the market would crash.
The annual growth rate of the mean of the stock-to-bond ratios can be estimated in terms of the
parameters of the model as (αβ )
mτ
2N .With this we can interpret (3) as
(4) E[R]/r = the rate of increase of the risk of a market breakdown;
the risk premium of the market portfolio is proportional to the rate of increase of the systematic
risk. Interestingly, a similar formula, relating the return to the increasing risk of a crash, applies to
a rational bubble, described in Blanchard-Watson [2].
As an alternative scenario to a crash, the group may switch to a different feedback mechanism (2)
with a ”pessimistic” bias, determined by the condition αβ < 1. The bubble will deflate gradually
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FIGURE 1. Gross returns during 200 trading periods. Top figure: deterministic
2-agent model. Middle figure: 2-agent model with noise; graph shows only the
returns from Petra and Paula trading sessions. Bottom figure: endogenous, multi-
agent model with N = 500 agents and m = 10 active traders. The bottom chart
shows 200 trading periods, after returns become stationary. In all models α = 3.01,
β = 0.34. Red lines are the geometric mean returns computed from (3): 1.012,
1.012 and 1.0006 for the top, middle and bottom chart, respectively.
to lower price levels. It can be deflated all the way to the starting price P0 and the only result of
this trading cycle will be the redistribution of initial funds among agents.
Gradual deflation is certainly a better alternative to a crash, as the former is always accompanied
by a panic behavior that has adverse effects on the economy. Interestingly, from the group prospec-
tive, both a crash and a deflation trading might have similar end results. Figure 5 shows simulated
distributions of portfolios after a crash and a 2-year deflation trading. The scatter plots of both
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FIGURE 2. Dollar value of shares traded per period.
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FIGURE 3. Logarithm of the stock price, after the returns become stationary.
Straight line is the mean return line of slope (3).
distributions are clearly comparable. However, to deflate the bubble with the adaptive feedback (2)
requires agents, from time to time, to buy shares when the stock price is clearly decreasing. This
condition might go counter with primarily individualistic preferences of agents, leading to a crash.
Let us finally mention that when the bubble is considered as a part of a bigger market environ-
ment there is also a possibility for it turning into a kind of a self-aggregated Ponzi scheme. After
all, a long-term stable growth of the bubble will attract new participants. While the influx of new
money keeps growing at the same rate as the return generated by the bubble, the agents can realize
the profit by selling stocks without dropping the price. The price bubble will prolong its existence
but its fate will be determined by the balance of in- and out-flux of money.
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FIGURE 4. Scatter plot of agents’ portfolios in 10 years. Lines of slope -1 are the
lines of the constant total wealth. The initial portfolios of all agents is marked with
’*’. The mean portfolio is marked with ’x’.
Market
Agent
stay sell
stay b0+0.1s0E[R]
n 0
sell b0+ s0E[R|
n b0
TABLE 1. Schematic decision matrix for Agent vs. Market game with the payoffs
to the agent in n years : b0 is value of the agent’s bond account. s0E[R]
n is the
stock account of the agent. The agent recovers all of it in sell-stay scenario. The
payoff stay-stay is uncertain; the agent expecting to recover cash value for at least
a fraction of her stock investment.
4. APPENDIX: PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL
Consider a set of N agents, described by their portfolios (si,bi), i = 1 . . .N, of dollar values of a
stock and cash accounts, and let ki stand for agent i stock-to-bond ratio, either actual, or a future,
target value. P0 will denote a current price per share and P the new price determined by agents’
demand. Let {il : l = 1 . . .m} be the set of “active” agents, i.e. the ones setting the new price. The
set of active traders is determined each trading period by a random draw from the population.
If xil is the dollar amount that agent il wants to invest in stock, then
P
P0
sil + xil
bil − xil
= kil .
ADAPTIVE MARKET BEHAVIOR 9
4 6 8 10 12 14 16
$ investment in bond
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
$ i
nv
es
tm
en
t in
 st
oc
k
FIGURE 5. Scatter plot of agents’ portfolios in 10 years of a growing bubble fol-
lowed by a crash or a gradual deflation: ‘o’ represent portfolios after a crash to the
starting level of stock price P0; ‘+’ represent portfolios after 2 years of deflating
bubble dynamics that brings the price down to P0; ‘*’ – portfolios of agents at time
t = 0.
The demand-supply balance is
m
∑
l=1
xil = 0,
which can be solved for P :
P
P0
=
(
m
∑
l=1
kil bil
1+ kil
)(
m
∑
l=1
sil
1+ kil
)−1
.
During the trading, the total amount of all cash accounts is conserved, as well as the number of
shares of stocks owned by agents. Note here, that we are assuming that any fractional amount a
share can be traded. Once the price is set, agents move corresponding amounts between cash and
stock accounts, re-balancing their portfolios. The update mechanism for new stock-to-bond ratios
is given by (2). The interaction is repeated the following trading periods with randomly selected
sets of active agents. As in 2-agent model, there is an equilibrium solution, when all agents have
balanced portfolios, si/bi = ki, i = 1, . . . ,N, and stock price doesn’t grow, Pn = Pn−1. If money in
saving accounts grow at the rate r, the equilibrium price will grow at the same rate Pn = rPn−1.
When the initial data are out of the equilibrium, the system will exhibit non-trivial dynamics,
diverging from the equilibrium.
In the non-equilibrium regime, the stock price increases or decreases according, together with
the mean stock-to-bond ratios. The return, however, becomes nearly stationary, with the geometric
mean approximately equal to (3), see [16]. The distribution of returns depends on the mechanism
for selecting a random group of active agents. If the number of active agents, m, is fixed the
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positive returns negative returns
m=5 0.1
m=10 0.07 -0.09
m=50 0.21 -0.47
S&P500 0.22 -0.54
TABLE 2. Correlation between mean positive (negative) returns and standard de-
viations. The adaptive model with N = 500 agents and m = 5,10,50 active traders
was used to compute the mean returns and standard deviations for 1000 different
values of α,β ∈ [0.8,1.5]. For S&P500, 85 pairs of the mean daily returns and stan-
dard deviations computed from non-overlapping, semi-annual periods of the index
from the period 1960-2010.
returns in the stationary regime follow log-normal distribution. If number m is itself random, for
example chosen from an uniform distribution, the returns have significantly more mass at the tails
and at 1, than a corresponding log-normal distribution. Moreover, the returns show no significant
correlations over the lags of two or more trading periods, while the next period return is negatively
correlated with the present one, see [16] for details.
Of interest are also statistical properties of the price dynamics for a collection of processes with
different values of parameters (α,β ). Table 2 presents the correlation between mean returns and
standard deviations. For each pair of values we compute the stationary mean positive or negative
return and the standard deviation, and consider the distribution of these values for a large number
of different values α,β in the vicinity of 1. The numbers do depend on other parameter of the
model, such as m and N, but they indicate positive correlation between mean positive return and the
standard deviation, and negative correlation between mean negative return and standard deviations.
This property is observed in the returns of real markets.
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